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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PARADIGM SHIFT AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR

Abstract

The article outlines the main features of the historical genesis of the international security paradigm shift from the moment of its institutional formalization to the present day. It has been substantiated that such a genesis has a sinusoidal-wave character and is related to the well-known 'Kondratiev waves', only unlike the latter, it is not of an economic, but of a security nature. In the historical and geopolitical context, five consecutive changes in the international security paradigm (Pre-systemic, Westphalian, Vienna, Versailles, Yalta-Potsdam, Unipolar) have been distinguished as a normatively recognized system of international relations of war and peace, based on the observance by all countries of the generally recognized principles and norms of international law, established in the relevant international treaties. The main factors of reaching the end of the unipolar world era and the growth of the role of 'fragile' states in the international security environment as potential objects of international military interventions and the space for deployment of local conflicts and wars have been characterized.

It has been concluded that the war in Ukraine acts as a key trigger for a new paradigm shift in international security and the rise of a new system of international relations, and the results of the Russian-Ukrainian war will determine the 'starting positions' and strong arguments in the hands of the United States of America and its allies against China and its allies in the course of the inevitable new global security conference on the formation of a new world order.

Keywords: *international security, international security paradigm, Russian-Ukrainian war.*

1. Problem Statement: a Historical Overview

Consideration of the issue of the international security paradigm involves the analysis and understanding of the role and place of key components of this global phenomenon, primarily such as: the international security environment (which should be viewed as the space of international relations, diplomacy and other forms of interstate interaction); subjects of international security (global supranational institutional bodies, interstate associations and blocs, sovereign states in the context of their national interests); dangers and threats (which are an immanent feature of the international security environment and are viewed as a set of factors that negatively affect the existence and development of states-subjects of international relations); global problems and challenges

(viewed as a set of factors, the choice of which determines the negative or positive state of existence and development of states-subjects of international relations); as well as dynamically changing opportunities (which are viewed as a set of factors that to a certain extent affect the existence and development of the subject of international relations and result from its actions or inaction in the international security environment) (Gryz, 2019, 16). In their totality, the components listed above form the international security system, which is defined as *a complex of interrelated interstate relations and organizations, political, diplomatic, economic, military and social measures aimed at ensuring the collective security of states and peoples. The main elements of the international security system are basic security principles, interstate mechanisms and structures, international legal norms, multilateral treaties that are created, adopted and function to prevent military clashes, localize them, settle political, economic and military-strategic contradictions by political means, as well as a special control regime of international, especially military activities, and the corresponding regime of information* (Zahola, 2022, 135).

In this context, we will try to outline the main features of the change in the international security paradigm from the moment of its institutional formalization to the present.

The history of Europe in the last millennium has been a history of great wars, the end of which has always been characterized by attempts to find the formula of 'Eternal Peace' (according to I. Kant) and the development of an appropriate international security paradigm. This process has a sinusoidal-wave character and is related to the well-known 'Kondratiev waves' (Blyzniuk, 2005), only unlike the latter, it is not economic, but security in nature.

In our opinion, in the context of geopolitics, we can talk about five consecutive paradigms of international security as a normatively recognized system of international relations of war and peace, based *on the observance by all countries of the generally recognized principles and norms of international law, which excludes the resolution of controversial issues and disagreements between them by using force or threats* (Zahola, 2022, 134).

Let us consider the main milestones of the historical scale of changes in the international security paradigm of Europe and the world shown in Figure 1.

Fig. 1. *Key milestones of changes in the international security paradigm*

The first such system was the so-called Peace of Westphalia, when in 1648 two peace treaties between the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation and France (in Münster) and Sweden (in Osnabrueck) ended the Thirty Years' War. The Peace of Westphalia completely reshaped the geography of medieval Europe, in particular, the Holy Roman Empire broke up into almost 300 independent state entities, and Switzerland and the Netherlands received state sovereignty. At the same time, realizing the similarity of their interests, the European states for the first time in world history laid the foundations for the concept of balance of power in world politics and recorded important mutual obligations of collective security. Recognizing that it was impossible to resolve interstate contradictions on a value (religious) basis (because values were not discussed and they were not conceded), national interests were laid at the foundation of the security paradigm formed by the Peace of Westphalia, on the basis of which it was possible to find compromise solutions.

The Münster and Osnabrueck treaties recorded the following obligations of the first world paradigm of international security:

- "the obligation of the contracting parties to maintain peace in mutual relations;
- prohibition of assistance in any form to the enemies of other contracting parties;
- liability of public peace violators;
- the obligation of mutual assistance of the contracting parties without distinction of religion;

- the actions of the contracting parties in the event of a breach of the treaty: the obligation to first use all peaceful means, if this is fruitless – the obligation to support the injured party in a peaceful or military form (but it is necessary to support it, so that the position of all parties to the agreements regarding the conflict was the same); the legal use of force according to the treaties is coercive actions against the violator of the peace, but not before the means of peaceful settlement are exhausted" (Rzhevska, 2012, 210).

2. The Peace of Westphalia

From the perspective of the modern understanding of history, the Peace of Westphalia and the security paradigm adopted by it are the most successful in the last millennium because on its basis, in the next 150 years, despite various types of military conflicts of a local scale, there were no major continental wars in Europe.

At the same time, 150 years of the existence of this state-centric model have revealed that under certain circumstances, the first of which is the appearance of strong charismatic leaders of the nation, the national interests of certain states begin to reach such global attractions that there is actually no room left for the national interests of other sovereign countries. The first to prove this fact was the General, Consul, Emperor of France, Napoleon Bonaparte. The war of aggression unleashed by him at the beginning of the 19th century covered the whole Europe and ended only with the defeat of Napoleon's troops and the holding of the Vienna International Conference in 1815, which was called the Vienna System of International Relations or the 'Concert of Europe'.

As V. Tsivatyi notes, "The Congress of Vienna (November 1, 1814 – June 8, 1815) was the largest and longest summit in the history of international politics and world diplomacy. It lasted nine months, and the heads of 216 European states attended it, the absolute majority of which – small European heads of state (princes) – were nothing more than a mass around the big 'five': Russia, Austria, Britain, Prussia and France that de facto decided the future fate of Europe" (Tsivatyi, 2016, 236).

The Congress of Vienna drew a line under the Napoleonic wars and built a new system of international relations and a new paradigm of international security – a paradigm of balance of power and peaceful settlement. The main content and sense were the consolidation of the following international obligations by the states participating in the Congress:

- recognition of the territorial and political status quo as a result of redrawing the European borders by the victorious states;
- the possibility of collective intervention in the affairs of those states that would try to resolve interstate conflicts by force, or that would be threatened with revolution;
- requirements for diplomatic consultations regarding territorial and other interstate problems;
- sovereignty was irrevocably defined as an attribute not of monarchs, but exclusively of states.

The next 100 years of European interstate relations completely fit the main regularity of the historical development of international security systems, namely, its wave nature. The peak start of such development was an institutionalized event – an international conference – which formed a new world order based on the principles of a new paradigm of international security adopted by the victorious states and gave a start to the peaceful period of European development. At the same time, an institutionalized 'security pole' was formed – an international entity clearly defined by its subject composition, which had a predetermined purpose of activity, constantly operating structures coordinating its activities for the peaceful resolution of interstate conflicts (Horovenko, 2023, 235).

From its peak, the wave goes down – during the period of peaceful coexistence. However, over time, new interstate contradictions inevitably grow due to the weakening of certain victorious states and the strengthening of other states, in particular, those at the expense of which the previous foundations of the security paradigm were established. The wave begins to rise up along the trajectory of increasing international tensions. And when the 'security pole' is unable to fulfill its peacekeeping function, a new Great War breaks out. And the new winners gather a new international conference and adopt a new paradigm of international security.

It was according to this logic that the events that led to the outbreak of the First and Second World Wars and their results developed.

3. The Treaty of Versailles

The end of the First World War and the defeat of Germany was recorded by the Paris Conference, which began on January 18, 1919. Of the series of peace treaties initiated during the Paris Conference, the first and most important was the treaty with Germany signed on June 28, 1919 in Versailles – later this name spread to the entire new system of international relations. The Versailles system actually established another division of the world. Germany lost 13.5% of its territory, 10% of its population and all its colonies. Nine new states appeared in Europe.

According to the Treaty of Versailles, a supranational 'security pole' – a political institution – the League of Nations was created for the first time in world history. The Covenant of the League of Nations enshrined: the principle of collective security, the principle of regional security; peaceful resolution of interstate conflicts at the Assembly of the League, reduction of armaments in Europe.

However, the main flaw of the Versailles system was that it was actually formed by only three leaders of three states: Great Britain, France and the USA. Germany, Russia and Austria-Hungary were absent from the Paris Conference for various reasons, other European states were largely marginalized and inactive due to the disastrous consequences of the war.

However, among the three countries with a decisive vote there was no unity in the vision of a new paradigm of international security. As the Polish historian Tomasz Schramm from Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań points out, the differences were that Great Britain defended the principle of the balance of power and the desire to gain an eastern ally by providing support to France in the face of a potentially threatening Central European state (previously Austria, in the new conditions – Germany). The means of maintaining peace were also supposed to be traditional – a system of political ties reinforced by the appropriate military potential. The dogmas of the United States were different too. The US felt more comfortable with the 'open door'

principle, and this type of assumption was to be expanded after the war, which had reduced Europe so much.

As a result, the Treaty of Versailles became *a kind of hybrid that combined solutions in the old style of the European balance of power and the new ones aimed at creating a multilateral security system* (Schramm, 2016, 117). The Versailles system, according to Schramm's definition, turned out to be 'deformed': in the conditions of progressive globalization, it had a regional dimension; moreover, it lacked two potentially very strong European states – Germany and Russia. As a result, Great Britain and France were disproportionately important in it – the states whose positions were weakened and which tried to be guided by old assumptions, inadequate to the situation at that time (Schramm, 2016, 117).

The instability of the Versailles system, caused by the complete disregard of Germany's national interests, overestimation of the role of France with the simultaneous underestimation of Germany and Russia, was exacerbated by the refusal of the United States to join the League of Nations as a key institutional 'security pole'. Therefore, in this historical period, the 'wave of peaceful coexistence' quickly passed in about 20 years, primarily as a result of a serious increase in the potential of Germany after the rise to power of Hitler and of Russia after the consolidation of Stalin's regime in Russia.

The radical change in the balance of power in the geopolitical space was 'a hard nut to crack' for the security institutions and mechanisms of the League of Nations and the Versailles system of international security and ended with the Second World War. According to Tomasz Schramm, the shortest conclusion about the collapse of the Versailles system is that: 1) a developed system was marked by deep internal contradictions, which practically condemned it to instability; 2) the creators of this system did not show sufficient determination in its protection (to some extent this was due to inaction, and to some extent to impossibility); 3) the correctness of the statement from the book *1066 and All That* published in 1930 should be admitted: *after the war that was supposed to put an end to wars, there came a peace that was supposed to put an end to peace* (Schramm, 2016, 119).

4. The Yalta-Potsdam System of International Security

Another turning point in the changes in the international security paradigm was the capitulation of Nazi Germany and the holding of the Yalta (February 3-11, 1945) and Potsdam (June 17 – August 2, 1945) conferences on the ruins of the Third Reich. The end of the Second World War was characterized by an unprecedented level of destruction on the European continent and a radical change in the role, power and influence of countries that ten or twenty years ago were capable of deciding the fate of the entire world. Hubert Walas, a graduate of the Department of International Relations at the Krakow University of Economics, describes the situation at that time as follows: *The dominant region, compared to the rest of the world, Europe, self-destructed within a few years. All the once mighty powers – Germany, France, Spain, the Netherlands, or even Britain – were shadows of their former selves. On their ruins rose the two powers that would dominate the world for decades to come. The scale of the military and industrial superiority of the United States of America and the Soviet Union over the rest of the world was overwhelming* (Walas, 2024). Therefore, the three leaders of the victorious countries – Stalin, Churchill and Truman – virtually without the participation of all other European countries redrew the map of Europe and established a new world order, which was called the Yalta-Potsdam system of international relations.

The new world order was structured in the United Nations Organization (1945) with the development of modern international law, the system of international security (established in 1975 in Helsinki at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe – OSCE) and the principles of multilateral diplomacy. The change in the international security paradigm consisted in the recognition of the world bipolarity with the actual division of the world into influence areas of two superpowers (the USA and the USSR), which quickly led to the emergence of superpower military blocs (NATO and the Warsaw Pact Organization), satellite to the hegemonic countries.

The key element of the new paradigm was the concept of 'deterrence' (peaceful confrontation). O. Shapovalova explains this as a factor of the exclusive possession of nuclear weapons by the USA and the USSR, which were capable of repeatedly destroying both these countries and the whole world.

Under such conditions, a conventional war became impossible, and the military and political-economic competition of the two newly formed poles *turned into a bipolar bloc confrontation, which acquired the quality of a basic relational complex in the world center, and later in the global system in general. Thus, the functions of the military-political center of the system moved to the level of interaction between superpowers and their blocs, while the European continent acted as the main operational field of bipolar confrontation and retained its centrality only in a similar object quality* (Shapovalova, 2013, 99).

Bipolarity, which was finally formed during the functioning of the Yalta-Potsdam system during the next 45 years, built a paradigm of deterrence, when the military confrontation took place in the form of an arms race and building up military potential, it was already a war that had a global character, but the character of the Cold War which kept the two opposing blocs from direct confrontation, they limited themselves to various kinds of proxy wars on the peripheries (Korea, Vietnam, Angola, etc.). From today's point of view, the historical period of the Cold War *was therefore one of great uncertainty and fear of nuclear annihilation, manifested, for example, in the Cuban Missile Crisis, but historically, it was one of the most peaceful periods in world history* (Walas, 2024).

In a war of this new type, it was no longer the armed forces, the number and training of armies, but the economy that came to the fore. The advantages of the market economy resulted in a significant increase in the standard of living in the NATO countries in the last quarter of the 20th century, which, together with the simultaneous stagnation of the socialist centralized economy and the total shortage of consumer goods, led to the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the socialist system as a whole. The USSR lost the Cold War, a symbol of which was the fall of the Berlin Wall, which was followed by the collapse of the Soviet Union itself. However, this time, the end of the war did not lead to any international conference. It was unnecessary – one state won in the war between two superpowers and the new world order was automatically formed by one victorious state. Likewise, there was no redistribution of territory, which was replaced by the redistribution of influence areas due to the inclusion of most countries of the world in the areas of US national interests – the era of globalization and the dominance of the neoliberal Pax Americana project in the United States at the top of the world hierarchy started (Asaturov, Martynov, 2022, 120).

5. The Paradigm of a Unipolar World

When the bipolar world of two superpowers became the world of a single hegemon – a unipolar era of the USA, a new radical change in the international security paradigm took place automatically, in which from now on there was a 'supreme judge' that controlled key international institutions and established the rules of the game in the global dimension. As the aforementioned Hubert Walas points out, *it was the only superpower to have the hegemon's attributes of power – the almighty Blue Water Fleet (the US Navy), which is the executive body of the hegemon's will. (…) Great wars thus became a relic of the past because the power that the Americans had built up around themselves placed them in the role of ultimate judge of every international dispute. (…) Thus the 'end of history' motif emerged. There was to be no wars, all disputes would be settled via international bodies. And if someone didn't like it, they would get a visit from the US Navy* (Walas, 2024).

At present, many experts and analysts believe that for the United States the status of the sole legislator of the values and procedures of international coexistence – the world 'rule-based order' together with the status of the global judge and the world 'policeman' turned out to be too heavy a burden for the leader of the neoliberal world, but most importantly, it was a great irritant for the revanchist states that sought to restore their lost global positions and for those 'Third World' countries that were gradually gaining their own power. The key here was the unprecedented growth of China which in past decades demonstrated annual GDP growth at the level of 10%.

Paradoxically, this was largely facilitated by the USA which in this way raised its biggest global opponent because in the midst of the Cold War back in the 1970s, the Americans, in order to weaken the USSR and the communist bloc led by it, on the initiative of Henry Kissinger, improved relations with Beijing and established close economic relations with China, slowly establishing the production facilities of various sectors of the economy on the mainland of the PRC, including high-tech and dual-purpose technologies (for example, Apple, the world flagship of mobile phones, still produces almost all of its phones in China).

Thanks to the mastery of new technologies and significant investment, *within two generations, China went from being an impoverished, backward country,*

crippled by Mao's policies, to becoming the world's second-largest superpower, with GDP growth of 10% a year for many decades. (…) Not only did China become a direct rival to the US, but it became a power center that began to reinforce any initiative to undermine the US hegemonic dominance in many parts of the world. (…) China was undermining the existing order not only by directly or indirectly supporting anti-American centers, but simply by being an alternative economic and industrial pole to the American or Europe (Walas, 2024).

China was quietly but extremely systematically expanding its influence on the 'Third World' countries – primarily in Africa and South America. Besides, other authoritarian regimes began to regain their strength, primarily Iran and Russia. Due to close economic cooperation with the European Union and the use of energy as a political weapon, Russia concentrated significant funds and invested them in the thorough modernization and expansion of its armed forces.

6. 'Fragile countries' – New Subjects of the International Security Environment

However, the first to challenge the American international order – Pax Americana – were not the classical ideological-political and military opponents mentioned above, but entities that until then were not even considered serious security threats. New changes in the international security paradigm are counted from September 11, 2001, when suicide attacks on the twin towers in New York raised terrorist groups and fundamentalist-terrorist states to the ranks of important subjects of the international security environment. This was stated directly by Richard Haass, the Director of Policy Planning for the United States Department of State at the time, who, speaking to the audience in the School of Foreign Service and the Mortara Center for International Studies at Georgetown University, emphasized: *The attacks of September 11, 2001 reminded us that weak states can threaten our security as much as strong ones, by providing breeding grounds for extremism and havens for criminals, drug traffickers, and terrorists* (Haass, 2003).

It can be seen that in the modern international security paradigm, a significant place is occupied by threats from the so-called 'fragile' states – essentially unstable, with a weak government and legal system, which *display various deficits in implementing the fundamental tasks required of the central administration of state power. These include, among others, monopoly control of the legal use of violence, enforcement of state law, fiscal policy, provision of essential social services and benefits, as well as local and international security issues* (Ficek, 2022, 24).

According to the definition of the Council of the European Union, *fragility refers to weak or failing structures and to situations where the social contract is broken due to the State's incapacity or unwillingness to deal with its basic functions, meet its obligations and responsibilities regarding the rule of law, protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, security and safety of its population, poverty reduction, service delivery, the transparent and equitable management of resources and access to power* (Council, 2007, 1-2).

To determine the level of stability/fragility of states, in 2005 the Fund for Peace created the Fragility States Index (FSI) as a systematic tool for assessing political risks and conflict situations that occur mainly in destabilized and vulnerable areas of unstable states. The methodology for calculating such an index consists in processing large arrays of information by the proprietary methodology of Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST) in four groups of indicators (cohesion, economic, political, social and cross-cutting indicators) according to 12 indicators: security apparatus, factionalized elites, group grievance; economic decline, uneven development, human flight and brain drain; state legitimacy, public services, human rights and rule of law; demographic pressures, refugees and IDPs, external intervention (FSI, 2023).

Depending on the obtained integral index, the countries of the world are divided into 4 main groups (with three subgroups in each of them):

1. Sustainable;
2. Stable;
3. Warning;
4. Alert.

In the context of the global and multidimensional concept of international security, the term 'fragile state' *is invoked in the perspective of the erosion of the state, stagnation and the collapse of the socio-economic order, violent socio-political conflicts, as well as frequent situations of human rights violations and humanitarian crises* (Ficek, 2022, 26) which can be used by international criminal organizations, terrorist groups and other aggressive states in their own interests against the interests of the 'fragile' state itself. Thus, state fragility threatens to destabilize the local, regional and international situation and *is both an incubator and a vector of many international threats* (Ficek, 2022, 29).

The global growth of concern about weak and fragile states in the context of international security is based on two main concepts:

1. traditional concepts of security, viewed in terms of interstate violence, which have been extended to issues of cross-border threats (e.g., terrorists), actions of non-state actors (organized crime), or forces of nature (diseases, natural disasters, or consequences related to environmental degradation);
2. the concept of threat originating from weak and ineffectively managed fragile states, as a result of which such states under certain circumstances become the object of international military interventions and the field of local wars (Brock et al., 2012, 46–95).

7. Ukraine as a Key Trigger for a New Paradigm Shift in International Security

According to the Fragility States Index, Ukraine has been considered one of such 'fragile states' for more than 15 years (Fig. 2), which, according to the results of the 2023 FSI index, for the first time in its history, moved from the category of 'warning countries' to the category of 'alert countries'.

To some extent, the 'fragility' of Ukraine (in the sense of the Fragility States Index) can be explained by the fact that immediately after Vladimir Putin came to power, the Russian Federation began to carry out regular interventions in the internal policy of independent Ukraine, destabilize the socio-political situation in the state, provoke and support various crisis situations aimed at splitting Ukrainian society. Russia's desire to resume its imperial formation,

which as defined by Kremlin ideologues (Dugin, Karaganov) *is impossible without the return of Ukraine*, became the main, if not the only, reason for the preparation of Russian aggression in 2022.

Fig. 2. *Dynamics of the Fragility States Index (a case study of countries typical for each fragility group)*

So, formally, the Kremlin leaders talked about preventing the expansion of NATO and the spread of the North Atlantic bloc to the Russian borders, it was on this thesis that Putin's ultimatum of December 2021, preceding the war with Ukraine, was based. However, in reality, Muscovites, with China and Iran behind them, are challenging the unipolar Pax Americana world for the sake of a new global redistribution of the world, contrary to the fundamental principles of international law.

As Marek Podraza notes, *law cannot be born by lawlessness. According to international law, the Russian invasion of Ukraine was not only a violation of its guiding principles, including the Charter, but primarily a violation of the legal order in force at that time, which regulated relations in the international community. The Russian Federation violated both the prohibition of the threat of armed force and its use, provided for in Article 2 of the Charter, and the*

fundamental principle of peaceful settlement of international disputes, provided for in Article 2 of the Charter. It also constituted aggression within the framework of Resolution 3314, since, according to Article 1 of the Annex to Resolution 3314, aggression is 'the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter.' Russia's response does not fall under any exceptions to the principle of the use of armed force, it was not carried out on the basis of authorization granted by the UN Security Council in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter, and the Russian Federation did not act in self-defense as defined by Article 51 of the Charter. Its actions were not based on the principles of necessity and proportionality. The Kremlin's actions meet all the conditions of an armed attack as defined by Article 51 of the Statute (Podraza, 2023, 227).

Thus, Ukraine simply turned out to be the key trigger for a new paradigm shift in international security and the rise of a new system of international relations, as US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken and many experts in the field of international security have already said. In particular, S. Feduniak emphasizes that *the Russian-Ukrainian war was a consequence of the lack of reliable means of maintaining international peace and stability after the end of the Cold War. At the same time, its consequences will create a foundation for the formation of a new system of international relations with appropriate security tools and mechanisms* (Feduniak, 2022, 138).

This thesis is specified by the aforementioned Hubert Walas: *the Americans rejected Putin's ultimatum, but at the same time, they rejected the policy of military deterrence against the Kremlin. (…) And so we found ourselves at the turn of 2023 and 2024. The unipolar moment we knew at the beginning of the century is behind us, but can we already call it a fully multipolar world? The Russians are putting their entire state on the line, which can collapse if it loses the war, to prove that Pax Americana has come to an end and that Washington's omnipotence has its physical limits. Realism tells us one thing – what the world order will be in the coming years and decades will be determined by decisions taken in two places in the world – Washington and Beijing* (Walas, 2024).

Here we have to agree that there will be no Kremlin dictator among the world leaders who will shape the new system and paradigm of international security in the coming years. After all, even the somewhat pro-Russian professor

of the University of Wroclaw Zbigniew Wiktor had to admit that *Putin's boasting of the victorious week-long campaign ('military special operation') in Ukraine was not justified. The war demonstrated the great military and economic weakness of Russia, as well as the high level of military preparedness of the Ukrainian army (mainly due to the comprehensive help of the West) to conduct a defensive war. Russia underestimated the military, economic, financial and propaganda assistance and moral and political support of the USA, NATO and the countries of the European Union* (Wiktor, 2023, 37-38).

Conclusions

Thus, the global paradigm of international security has a set of features of the international security environment and by its nature reflects the current geopolitical balance of power, as a result of which it is a dynamic phenomenon that responds to tectonic shifts in the power of key states of the world at every historical stage of the development of human civilization.

The above research shows the wave nature of the dynamics of changes in the international security paradigm, which allows us to distinguish six stages of such a change (Pre-systemic, Westphalian, Vienna, Versailles, Yalta-Potsdam, Unipolar) and determine that the modern world is at the peak of transition to a new system of international security, the trigger of which was the Russian-Ukrainian war, the potential outlines of which are already being actively discussed both in the expert environment and in the leading capitals of the world.

Thus, the events in Ukraine not only proved the inadequacy of the UN activities in response to existing threats and challenges and the incapacity of the existing international security system, but also at present new outlines of the future world, new formats of interstate relations, and a new paradigm of international security are forming. And the results of the Russian-Ukrainian war will determine the 'starting positions' and strong arguments in the hands of the United States of America and its allies against China and its allies during the inevitable new global security conference on the formation of a new world order.

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