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ORIGINAL PAPER
Strategic Competition and its implications for international security
1
Piotrków Academy in Piotrków Trybunalski
2
Uniwersytet Pomorski w Słupsku
Submission date: 2024-01-07
Acceptance date: 2024-12-03
Publication date: 2024-12-29
JoMS 2024;60(6):24-45
KEYWORDS
TOPICS
ABSTRACT
Objectives:
This article presents the results of research, which set out to clarify the concept of strategic competition and its practical consequences expressed in terms of threats to international security.
Material and methods:
Literature analysis and criticism, non-participatory observation and case studies were used to solve the research problems.
Results:
The research process established that the essence of competition is the pursuit of power, security, wealth, influence and international status. Strategic competition is constantly intensifying, and their consequences are having a negative impact on global security. Revisionist powers and rogue regimes use corruption, predatory economic practices, propaganda, political subversion, proxy wars, threats of military force and nuclear blackmail to alter the existing international order.
Conclusions:
It has been established that currently the main threat to global security is the Russian Federation.
This article presents the results of research, which set out to clarify the concept of strategic competition and its practical consequences expressed in terms of threats to international security.
Material and methods:
Literature analysis and criticism, non-participatory observation and case studies were used to solve the research problems.
Results:
The research process established that the essence of competition is the pursuit of power, security, wealth, influence and international status. Strategic competition is constantly intensifying, and their consequences are having a negative impact on global security. Revisionist powers and rogue regimes use corruption, predatory economic practices, propaganda, political subversion, proxy wars, threats of military force and nuclear blackmail to alter the existing international order.
Conclusions:
It has been established that currently the main threat to global security is the Russian Federation.
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