Objectives:
Our study, wants to point out to the fact that there are also opposing trends indicating of continual centralization of Iraq and the Kurdistan integration into the Iraqi state.

Material and methods:
we provide an analysis of the Iraqi constitution adopted in 2005 in terms of the Kurds. Based on this analysis, we want to demonstrate that the constitution will not lead to the federalization of Iraq, as many political analysts say. On the contrary, the constitution is an expression of the efforts of Iraqi Arab political elites to centralize political power in Baghdad.

Results:
The factors common to the entire Kurdish ethnic group do not coincide with oppression and denial of the right to self-determination in the past. Instead, the division of the Kurdish community into individual tribal groups prevails. Many of these tribal clusters do not see centralization of power by the Baghdad government as a threat. On the contrary, good relations with the central power can lead to the strengthening of one tribe at the expense of other clusters

Conclusions:
From this point of view, we believe that several Western geopolitical theorists like R. Peters are mistaken in advocating the emergence of an independent Iraqi Kurdistan. Because of the considerable fragmentation, it is impossible to speak of a uniform identity. Moreover, talking about the geopolitical contribution of an independent pro-Iraqi Kurdistan is also very controversial. Several cases show that Iraqi Kurdish political leaders are also able to work with anti-Western political regimes.