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Applying Game Theory To North Korea-China relations
Nicolas Levi 1
 
 
 
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Wyższa Szkoła Gospodarki Euroregionalnej im. Alcide De Gasperi w Józefowie
 
 
Publication date: 2017-06-30
 
 
JoMS 2017;33(2):355-366
 
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References (24)
 
KEYWORDS
institutional limitations
Nash Equilibrium
international relations
game theory
theoretical approach
 
ABSTRACT
Relations between North Korea and China are not improving on political matters since 2006, when North Korea started to do regular nuclear attempts. In order to explain the nature of relations between these both countries, I propose to apply the framework of Game theory. These concepts and the notion of risk dominance will be used to describe the general diplomatic strategy between North Korea and China and to account for North Korea’s constant provocations. A situation of the Game theory called the Nash Equilibrium will be applied to suggest policy lines specifically after the stronger provocations of the North Korean state. At conclusive remarks, some limitations toward Game theory on its application on relations between China and North Korea will be suggested.
 
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